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Are Politicians Office or Policy Motivated? The Case
of U.S. Governors’ Environmental Policies
Abstract
Are elected politicians primarily motivated by holding office, thus choosing environmental
policies accordingly? Or are they motivated by the chance to implement their preferred
environmental policies? Do governors have character, in the sense that they promise and
implement environmental policies consistent with their own preferences? To answer these
questions, we study the differences in environmental spending across both re-electable and
lame duck governors from the two main political parties. In our empirical analysis, we
make use of parametric and non-parametric regression-discontinuity approaches. While re-
electable governors do not set significantly different policies, lame duck governors do. We
argue that in the area of environmental policy governors appear to be primarily office moti-
vated and lack character.
Keywords: Political Economy, Term Limits, Candidate Motivation, Elections, Environmen-
tal Spending, States, Regression Discontinuity.
JEL Codes: Q58, H7, D7, C21
2
“I will fight for the environment. Nothing to worry about.”
- Gubernatorial candidate Arnold A. Schwarzenegger in August, 2003.1
1. Introduction
Are politicians primarily motivated by holding office or by the chance to implement their
preferred policies? Theoretical contributions to the literature have generally exogenously
assumed either of these two driving forces.2 Persson and Tabellini (2000), e.g., find such
opposing views unsatisfactory, and an improved empirical understanding of politicians’ mo-
tivations thus appears helpful in the evaluation of existing theory, and in future model
building including analysis of environmental policy formation (Persson and Tabellini, 2000;
Callander, 2008).3 In addition, since public office comes with significant powers to set en-
vironmental policy, it appears of significant importance to empirically discern politicians’
motivations for seeking office. Analysis of politicians’ underlying motivations should help
us better understand instances of political failure in the area of environmental policy, e.g.,
why public policies aimed at providing environmental amenities frequently deviate from their
optimal designs (see, e.g., Babcock et al., 1997; Wu and Boggess, 1999; Wu et al., 2001).4 In
this paper, we take a step towards an improved empirical understanding of the motivations
guiding politicians in the area of environmental policy. In particular, our objective is to em-
pirically investigate the motivations exhibited by state governor’s environmental spending
choices.
Recent theoretical contributions guide our empirical work. Callander (2008) presents a
model of electoral competition with heterogenously motivated (office and policy motivated)
political candidates (both types have not previously appeared in the same model). In Callan-
der’s model, candidates commit to a policy position before an election, but the quality of
implementation depends on the effort level exerted after winning office. Policy motivated
candidates are assumed to care relatively more about policy outcomes (office motivated can-
didates may still put some relatively minor weight on policy), and if elected therefore exert
3
more effort in the policy implementation process. Voters weigh ideology against the quality
of policy implementation, but cannot observe candidates’ inherent type. Both types are
fully strategic. Since voters endogenously prefer policy motivated candidates, office moti-
vated candidates attempt to imitate their policy motivated opponents. Meanwhile, policy
motivated candidates attempt to signal their type and separate from office motivated types.
The policies that emerge as a result of political competition between heterogeneously mo-
tivated candidates may yield either convergence or divergence. That is, in an incomplete
information environment the median voter may not support the candidate that promises the
policy closest to her ideal point, and the median voter does not necessarily induce conver-
gence. Callander’s (2008) model suggests that politicians who are moving away from the
median voter’s preferred policy may not do so due to their wish to implement their own
preferred policy, but rather to win votes.
Kartik and McAfee (2007) present a related model where some political candidates have
unobservable “character” (policy preferences) and choose electoral platform and post election
policies accordingly (see also Ansolobehere and Snyder, 2000; Groseclose, 2001; Aragones and
Palfrey, 2002). Candidates with character are non-strategic and thus their platforms are set
exogenously. In Kartik and McAfee (2007), strategic politicians without character imitate
the policy positions of candidates with character, as voters are assumed to value character.
This pushes policy choices away from the median voter’s favored position. Non-centrist
candidates may not actually have character but may be strategically mimicking opponents
with desirable character. However, there will still be a tendency by strategic types to move
towards the median voter.5
In this paper, we attempt to shed empirical light on the motivations guiding state politi-
cians’ environmental policy choices. Are state governors office or policy motivated, as dis-
cussed by Callander (2008)? Do they have character as modeled by Kartik and McAfee
(2007)? Our empirical strategy focuses on actual environmental policymaking by Demo-
cratic and Republican governors in two different situations, i.e. our analysis proceeds in
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two steps. First, we estimate the difference in environmental policy choice across incumbent
Democratic and Republican state governors who are eligible for re-election. We assume that
if politicians are policy motivated in the area of environmental policy, their policy prefer-
ences will coincide with their own party’s ideology, a view supported by, e.g., Poole and
Rosenthal (1984). These ideologies may, or may not, differ across political parties (our em-
pirical analysis below suggests that they differ).6 By comparing the environmental policy
choice across re-electable governors from different parties we evaluate whether policies con-
verge or diverge, i.e. whether pooling or separating equilibria emerge. On the one hand, if
a majority of governors are sufficiently policy motivated (or, have character) in the area of
environmental policy, this would lead to environmental policy divergence across governors of
different party affiliations; a separating equilibria emerges. On the other hand, if all elected
politicians are office motivated (or, lack character), or if office motivated candidates pool
at policy motivated candidates’ bliss points (alternatively, strategic politicians mimic those
with character), this would lead to environmental policy convergence across governors of
different party affiliations; a pooling equilibria emerges.
Second, we estimate the difference in environmental policy selected by governors who face
a binding term limit (i.e., have lame duck status). By studying the environmental policy
difference across lame duck governors, we aim to observe the actual difference in governors’
ideal points conditional on party affiliation. Lame duck governors are generally assumed to
set policy at their ideal points (Alesina, 1988; Besley and Case, 1995; List and Sturm, 2006).7
Comparing environmental policy differences across re-electable and lame duck governors
offers an opportunity to infer the motivations of governors in the area of environmental policy.
For example, suppose re-electable governors exhibit no policy differences across parties, while
lame duck governors exhibit significant policy differences. This would indicate that they have
heterogeneous environmental policy preferences that are dominated by the office motive as
long as they are eligible for re-election.
The environmental policy measure in focus is the growth rate of state environmental
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expenditures during the 1970 to 2000 period (the categories are: fish and game; forests and
parks; other natural resources). This measure has the advantage of being available for a
relatively long time period, it is largely determined by decisions at the state level rather
than the federal level (see, e.g., Brown, 2001), and is likely to be relatively unaffected by
considerations related to interstate capital competition.8
As the winning candidates from different parties can be different in many (observable and
unobservable) dimensions, failure to control for these differences sufficiently may preclude
us from making meaningful inferences from the simple comparisons of the policy outcome
across governors from different parties (e.g., simple OLS approach). In our estimations, we
utilize both parametric and non-parametric regression-discontinuity designs (RDD) to cir-
cumvent this problem. These two RDD approaches exploit the fact that the party affiliation
of the winning candidate is a deterministic function of vote share obtained by Democratic
candidates. In other words, if we know the vote share of the Democratic party, we are certain
about the party affiliation of the winning candidate. As a result, there is no confounding
variable other than vote share (see Angrist and Pischke (2009) for further discussion). Intu-
itively, RDD approaches identify the causal effects of governor party affiliation by comparing
policy outcomes of treatment and control groups with similar vote shares, i.e. states where
the Democratic candidate barely won the election (the winning candidate is a Democrat)
and states where Democratic candidates barely lost the election (the winning candidate is
a Republican). Conditioning on similar vote shares, the RDD approaches mimic a random
assignment of the party affiliation of the governor (Lee et al., 2004; Lee, 2008; Warren,
2008), thereby addressing the endogeneity problem associated with the incumbent’s party
affiliation. Utilizing these empirical techniques in our setting assures that the results are not
due to the preferences of the constituency, but rather the objective and motivation of the
winning candidate.
Our empirical results help shed novel empirical light on the motivations of politicians in
the area of environmental policy. Competition between re-electable Democratic and Repub-
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lican governors results in pooling equilibria; we find no significant differences in the growth
rates of environmental spending in the 1970-2000 time period across governors from these
two political parties. Turning to our estimates of lame duck governors’ policy differences,
however, we find a significant policy gap across political parties. Our results imply that
Democratic lame duck governors set approximately 4-9% points lower growth rates in en-
vironmental spending than do their Republican counterparts. This suggests that the ideal
growth rates are significantly different across parties, lending support to our assumption that
political ideologies and preferences for environmental spending differ across parties.
In sum, we find that policy motivation and character do not appear to be important
attributes of governors winning elections. Governors who win repeated elections (and thus
end up as lame ducks) appear primarily office motivated in the area of environmental policy.
However, they do have some degree of weak policy motivation (heterogeneous across polit-
ical party). Our findings are robust to several modifications of the data set, including the
exclusion of Southern states (where party differences historically have been close to indistin-
guishable) and the exclusion of states classified as “Green states” with high environmental
group membership ratios.
We believe our results complement the related empirical literature. Levitt (1996) finds
that ideology is the overwhelming influence on U.S. senators’ voting behavior, while voter
preferences and the national ”party line” are of minor importance in their utility functions.
The literature on reputation building shows that policy is frequently distorted by politicians
seeking to attract voters (Besley and Case, 1995, 2003; List and Sturm, 2006). Besley and
Case (1995) found that Democratic term limited governors set significantly higher per capita
total state taxes and state expenditures than other governors, while Besley and Case (2003)
(extending their previous data set) find a significant effect only for state expenditures. List
and Sturm (2006) find that re-electable governors cater to constituents with strong (pro- or
anti-) environmental interests as long as they are eligible for re-election, but reverse this pat-
tern upon gaining lame duck status. List and Sturm (2006) do not directly study inter-party
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political competition. Cremer et al. (2008) build on Roemer (2001) where two parties each
have militant (policy motivated) and opportunistic (office motivated) factions, and study
the consequences for environmental policy outcomes. They calibrate a model using U.S.
household data on income and preferences. When the militants of each party dominate, the
equilibrium involves large national emission tax increases, whereas when the opportunists
dominate subsidies are offered by both parties. The model also produces election probabili-
ties, where the Democratic party is heavily favored in equilibria where the tax rate is raised
sharply. However, Democrats and Republicans have fairly similar election probabilities in
equilibria which entail subsidies. Since U.S. gasoline taxes are relatively low, the U.S. has
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and the national party in power switches frequently, Cremer
et al. (2008) interpret their results as indication that at the national level U.S. environmental
policy has been guided mostly by the opportunistic factions of the Democratic and Repub-
lican parties. Our results constitute more direct evidence that U.S. environmental policies
are guided by office motivated (opportunistic) politicians at various levels of government.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and
empirical methodologies used. Section 3 reports the main empirical results, as well as a
robustness analysis. Section 4 provides a brief conclusion.
2. Data and Empirical Methodology
Based on the above discussion of the theoretical literature, our empirical analysis seeks to
determine whether U.S. governors are primarily office or policy motivated in the area of envi-
ronmental policy by estimating the: (i) environmental policy differences across re-electable
Democratic and Republican governors; (ii) environmental policy differences across Demo-
cratic and Republican governors facing binding term limits. In order to identify the causal
effects of party affiliation on environmental policies, we employ two different regression-
discontinuity designs (RDD). As mentioned above, these RDD approaches identify the causal
effects of party affiliation by comparing the policy outcomes of the treatment and control
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groups with similar vote shares. Conditioning on similar vote shares, these RDD approaches
mimic a random assignment of the party affiliation of the governor (Lee et al., 2004; Lee,
2008; Warren, 2008), thereby addressing the endogeneity problem associated with the incum-
bent’s party affiliation. RDD can be used as randomized experiment because even though
governors can influence vote shares, they cannot do so precisely. Intuitively, even though
some governors are more likely to win than others, every governor has approximately the
same chance of being just above or below the threshold. This implies that the local random
assignment property of the RDD holds (see Lee (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for
detailed derivations).
In practice, both parametric and nonparametric RDD approaches are employed. These
two approaches differ in the means that they control for election vote shares: the parametric
approach includes a flexible function of vote share in the regression estimation, whereas
the nonparametric approach utilizes a sub-sample of states with close elections. These two
approaches are equivalent asymptotically. Now we turn to more formal discussions of these
approaches.
2.1. Empirical Methodology: Parametric Approach
To begin, let Y1 and Y0 denote two environmental policy variables to be compared. In
particular, Y1 (Y0) represent potential environmental policies if a governor is a Democrat
(Republican), such that
Y1 = β + δ + u1
Y0 = β + u0 (1)
The difference in environmental policies between Democratic and Republican governors is
captured by δ. However, we never observe both Y1 and Y0 for the same governor as the
governor cannot be a Democrat and Republican at the same time. Notice, however, that the
observed policy for governor i could be expressed as Yi = Y1Di +(1−Di)Y0, where Di is the
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party membership of the governor in state i, Di = 1 if Democratic, Di = 0 if Republican.
Thus, we could write the observed outcome as a regression model,
Yi = Y1Di + (1−Di)Y0
= Di(β + δ + u1) + (1−Di)(β + u0)
= β + δDi + ui (2)
where ui = u0 + Di(u1 − u0). Equation (2) is a common regression model. If E[u|D] = 0,
we can consistently estimate the effects of party ideology on environmental policies, δ, by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, this assumption implies that gubernatorial party
affiliation is uncorrelated with any other determinants of environmental policies. Such an
assumption may be too restrictive and potentially fail to hold.
Although we can alleviate the bias by controlling for those (observable) variables that
are commonly regarded as the determinants of environmental policies, it may still not be
sufficient to identify the causal effect of candidate motivations based on party affiliation. As
a result, recent studies of the party effects on policy outcomes have utilized the regression
discontinuity design (RDD) method (Lee et al., 2004). This method exploits the fact that
given the majority rule, the election outcome is a deterministic function of vote margin
(“sharp” RDD),
Di = I(mi > 0) (3)
where mi is vote margin. Note that in the sharp RDD,
E[u|D,m] = E[u|m] = f(m) (4)
Equation (4) implies that we can include and explicitly model the conditional expectation
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E[u|D,m] in (2). Equation (2) becomes
Yi = β + δDi + ui
= β + δDi + E[ui|Di,m = mi] + εi
= β + δDi + f(mi) + εi (5)
where β is a constant, δ is the coefficient of interest (the candidate party affiliation effect), f(.)
is a flexible function of m, and εi = ui−E[ui|D,m = mi] is the error term. By construction,
the error term, εi, is no longer correlated with the party affiliation, Di, and thus, explicitly
controlling for f(mi) in the model, δ can be consistently estimated via OLS.
9’10 However,
the main issue in the estimation is selecting the correct functional form of f(.). While
over-specification of f(.) leads to consistent yet less precise estimates, under-specification
produces inconsistent but more efficient estimates (Warren, 2008). Following the literature,
the parametric specifications with quartic polynomials are preferred throughout the paper,
as quartic polynomials are generally very flexible in the approximation of an underlying
nonlinear function (see, e.g., Lee et al., 2004). Below, we nevertheless experiment with the
functional form of f(.) and utilize a less model-dependent nonparametric approach to assess
robustness.
Several additional estimation issues warrant further discussion. First, in order to fully
utilize the panel structure of our data, we include both state and time fixed effects in Equation
(5). Moreover, as Hoxby (2000) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) note, the inclusion of these
fixed effects allows us to use only within-state variations to identify the party affiliation
effects; this is desirable since it is “more powerful and less subject to bias” (Hoxby, 2000,
p.1253). Second, inclusion of additional covariates is in general not necessary in the RDD
estimation. However, if the additional covariates are orthogonal to the treatment (conditional
on the control functions), inclusion of these variables will not dramatically alter the estimates,
and could potentially increase their precision. Thus, below we also add additional controls
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(from List and Sturm, 2006), which also serves as a robustness check for the randomness of
the RDD estimation (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008).
2.2. Empirical Methodology: Non-parametric Approach
Although a flexible function with higher order terms is likely to approximate the un-
derlying function f(.) reasonably well, the control function approach is model dependent.
Therefore, we in addition employ a local linear regression approach (a non-parametric ap-










Equation (6) implies that the difference between the conditional means (averages) of Y of
those individuals just below and above the cutoff point (i.e., only close elections are relevant)
would give us a consistent estimate of δ, provided that the observations are similar around




E[u|m] = 0). The local linear regression approach
is employed here. Guided by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we utilize a simple rectangular
kernel for local linear regression estimation. Notice that the local linear regression approach
with a simple rectangular kernel is equivalent to fitting linear regression functions to the
observations falling into the interval around the cut-off point (that is, all observations falling
outside the interval are excluded), with the radius being the bandwidth h. That is, the effect




1{−h ≤ mi ≤ h}(Yi − β − δDi − α1mi − α2miDi)2 (7)
The practical question is the choice of bandwidth, h. The bandwidth h defines “close”
elections, and thus the sample utilized in estimation. For example, the bandwidth h = 2
means that we utilize only the sample of those states where the Democratic candidate barely
lost with a vote share equal or greater than 48 percent, as well as those where the Democratic
candidate barely won with vote share equal or less than 52 percent. The trade-off here is
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similar to that in the parametric approach – a trade-off between efficiency and consistency.
As seen from (6), as the interval (i.e. bandwidth h) increases, we increase the precision of
our estimates by utilizing more observations in the analysis, but introduce larger bias by
including more observations which may be quite different. On the other hand, as we restrict
the sample to a smaller neighborhood, we find more consistent but potentially insignificant
results due to the decreasing sample size. Indeed, a drawback is that the nonparametric
approach is quite data-demanding. Thus, we experiment with several bandwidths in order
to assess the robustness of our results. Moreover, as Lee and Lemieux (2010) note, even
for nonparametric RDD estimation using only data around the cut-off point, there could
still be bias. Thus, nonparametric estimation is a complement rather than a substitute for
parametric estimation.
2.3. Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
Assuming that the RDD works, we have thus far motivated the RDD approach from the
potential outcome framework and discussed several important practical issues. But how do
we know that the RDD is appropriate in our context? Note that an important assumption
behind the RDD is that E[u|m] = f(m) is a continuous function in m, see Equations (4) and
(6). While it is impossible to test this assumption since u is unobserved, it is possible to test
whether E[u|m] is continuous at the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). A discontinuity at
the threshold (0 in our case) would indicate a failure of this assumption. Lee and Lemieux
(2010) summarizes two tests proposed in the literature. The first test is to examine whether
or not there exists a discontinuity in the baseline covariates at the threshold. This test is
similar to tests that seek to demonstrate whether or not individuals in the treatment and
control groups are similar so as to assess the validity of randomized experiments (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The second test, proposed by McCrary (2008), is
to test whether the marginal density of m is continuous – the log density test. A word of
caution is warranted concerning these tests. Both of these tests are not a sufficient and
necessary condition for identification. For example, for the first test, we still cannot test
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the balancing property of the unobserved characteristics at the threshold. For the second
test, it is valid under auxiliary assumptions (McCrary, 2008). That said, they are useful
indications of the plausibility of the underlying continuity/smoothness assumption, and we
shall conduct both tests below to assess the validity of the RDD.
2.4. Data
The majority of the 1970 - 2000 data comes from List and Sturm (2006) and the remaining
part from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006). We thus provide limited details here. The main
variable of interest is the growth rate in environmental spending per capita. Following
List and Sturm (2006), we define environmental spending per capita as the sum of three
expenditure categories: (i) “fish and game,” (ii) “forests and parks,” and (iii) “other natural
resources”. List and Sturm (2006, page 1261) argue that these three spending categories
”‘record very similar types of expenditure, which are likely to be close substitutes for voters
both in favor of and opposed to environmental policy.”’ One advantage of this measure for
our purposes is that it depends to a large extent on state level political decisions (see Brown
(2001)), not federal regulations. Although the federal government has partial influence over
environmental policy, the states have considerable control over environmental expenditures,
as discussed by List and Sturm (2006). Another advantage is the relatively long panel, with
enough observations of lame duck period behavior.11 Moreover, governors appear unlikely
to engage in interstate capital-competition using environmental spending.
A dummy variable indicating lame duck governor status was constructed by Besley and
Case (1995) and Besley and Case (2003), and was updated by List and Sturm (2006). This
dummy takes a value of one when a governor faces a binding term limit and cannot seek re-
election, and zero otherwise.12 We include the control variables from List and Sturm (2006):
state personal income per capita; the percentage of the population with membership in
major environmental organizations (Sierra Club, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth); state
population; percentage of the population over age 65, and the percentage of the population
aged 5-17. We choose these variables mainly for two reasons. First, we want to include
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the same set of variables permitting the comparisons of results with the prior literature;
these variables are the same as in List and Sturm (2006) and commonly included variables
in related studies (e.g., Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). Second, as discussed above, inclusion of
observable variables is not necessary in the RDD estimation, but helps increase the precision
of the estimates. The party affiliation and vote data come from Ansolabehere and Snyder
(2006). Vote margins are constructed as the Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote
share (minus 50 percent) that go to the top two candidates in the most recent gubernatorial
election. We only consider votes that go to the top two candidates, and only elections
with Democratic and Republican top candidates, i.e. we ignore an election if a third party
candidate wins or comes in second. The vote margins in the most recent gubernatorial
election are used.13
Table I presents summary statistics. A comparison of the growth rates of environmen-
tal expenditure per capita for Republican and Democratic governors, respectively, indicates
a difference of 0.5 percentage points (3.3 percent for Republicans versus 3.8 percent for
Democrats). While the growth rate is higher in states with Democratic governors, a fur-
ther scrutiny of the summary statistics indicates that states with Republican governors are
different from those with Democratic governors in multiple dimensions. For example, Demo-
cratic governors are more likely to be elected in states with a larger share of young persons
in the population, but less likely to be elected in states with higher per capita personal
income and with an older population (over age 65). This indicates that observed differ-
ences in environmental policy between Republican and Democratic governors may simply be
due to differences in observable determinants of environmental policies that are correlated
with governor election outcomes. Moreover, given the differences in these observable char-
acteristics, it is possible that states with Democratic governors differ in some unobservable
dimensions from states with Republican governors. This preliminary scrutiny of the data
suggests that it is important to take potential endogeneity problems into account, and thus
that our empirical approach is particularly relevant in this context.
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3. Empirical Results
3.1. Governors and Environmental Policy
We now turn to our empirical results. Prior to presenting our main results, we first
provide a graphical analysis of state environmental policy. Figure 1 shows the relationship
between the vote margin and the growth rate in average per capita environmental spending
(within 1 percent intervals of the vote margin), separately for re-electable (Panel (a)) and
lame duck (Panel (b)) governors. The thick lines are fitted values from fourth order poly-
nomial regressions, and the thin lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Following
the literature (e.g. Lee et al., 2004), the data points in the graphs are the averages of the
growth rate of state environmental spending within each bin. For a given bandwidth h, we
construct bins (bk, bk+1], where bk = 0− (K0−k+1) ·h; K0 is the total number of bins to the
left of the cut-off point 0, and k = 1, . . . , K (the total number of bins). Plotting the averages
instead of the raw data makes the graph clearer and the interpretation more straightforward.
However, the identified jump is the same. See the survey articles by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for more details. As discussed before, the effect of party
affiliation is identified by the discrete jump of a flexible function (here, a quartic function)
of vote margin at the cut-off point, zero. A negative (positive) vote margin implies that
a Republican (Democratic) governor is elected. As we can see from Figure (1), the jump
(measured by the difference between two functions) at the cut-off point is small and positive
for the sample of re-electable governors. That the confidence intervals for both fitted lines
overlap considerably indicates that such a difference is likely to be statistically insignificant.
In contrast, for the sample of lame duck governors the jump is large and negative. That
the confidence intervals for both fitted lines do not overlap indicates that such a difference
is likely to be statistically significant. Figure 1 thus illustrates a small (statistically insignif-
icant) positive effect of party affiliation on the growth rate in environmental spending per
capita for re-electable governors, but a large (statistically significant) negative effect for lame
duck governors. This provides some initial evidence that governors behave differently when
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they are lame ducks. As noted in Lee and Lemieux (2010), graphical presentation may easily
be manipulated and thus mask the true effects. In Panels (c) and (d) we further provide a set
of graphs using the bandwidth chosen by the cross-validation method proposed by Ludwig
and Miller (2007) to minimize the bias in presentation. The results are similar.
Table II displays three sets of RDD results for governors eligible to run for re-election.
For completeness, we also include the result of OLS estimation in Column (1). Panels A.1
and A.2 are the parametric results without and with covariates included in the estimations,
respectively. Columns (2)-(5) report the RDD results using different polynomials for the
control function. Panel B presents the nonparametric results using four different bandwidths,
h. The coefficients reveal the effect on the growth rate of environmental spending of having
a re-electable Democratic governor in office rather than a Republican. The results in Panel
A.1 reveal a positive but statistically insignificant effect of winning governor party affiliation
on environmental policy; the coefficient is roughly zero.
As discussed above, the inclusion of additional covariates is not necessary in RDD es-
timation. However, suppose the covariates – those orthogonal to or uncorrelated with the
party affiliation around the cut-off points – are important determinants of environmental
policy Yi. Then, including these variables may reduce the residual variance, thereby improv-
ing the precision of estimates. In addition, inclusion of these additional variables should
not dramatically alter the RDD estimates, and thus serve as an additional robustness check
(Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Therefore, we re-estimate the RDD
models augmented by all additional controls discussed in the data section above. The results
are presented in Panel A.2. We again find that the difference in the growth rate of envi-
ronmental spending under re-electable Democratic and Republican governors is statistically
insignificant across all specifications. Moreover, the results reported in Panels A.1 and A.2
display a high degree of similarity, indicating that RDD is a valid design.
We recognize that the RDD results above using the control function approach are model
dependent. Therefore, we further assess the robustness of our parametric results by utilizing
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a non-parametric RDD approach. Panel B in Table II displays the results. The estimates
are consistent with the results presented in Panels A.1 and A.2, regardless of bandwidths
chosen. As the bandwidth declines (yielding smaller bias) in the nonparametric estimation,
the coefficient magnitudes generally become larger.14 The inter-party difference does not
attain statistical significance at conventional levels.15 In sum, the insignificant results pre-
sented in Table II suggest that re-electable governors tend to reach a pooling equilibrium
in the environmental policy dimension. Unless all governors have identical environmental
policy preferences (not supported by our estimation results below), this suggests that a
non-negligible share of governors are office motivated in regards to environmental policy.
We now turn to the results emerging from using the sample of lame-duck governors only,
presented in Table III. The columns are analogous to those in Table II. While the OLS
results in Panels A.1 and A.2 are insignificant, the RDD estimates in these panels are neg-
ative and statistically significant across all specifications. The estimates are economically
significant, varying from -4.6 percent to -8.2 percent. The results suggest that the growth
rate of environmental expenditures is slower when a Democratic lame duck governor is in
office relative to when a Republican lame duck is seated.16 Adjusting for covariates mat-
ters very little, as indicated in Panel A.2 in Table III. In particular, the point estimates
remain negative, statistically and economically significant, ranging from -4.1 percent to -7.8
percent.17
Next, Panel B in Table III presents the results using nonparametric RDD estimation.
Again, we find negative and statistically significant impacts of Democratic governor party
affiliation on environmental spending. The results are robust to the choice of bandwidths.
Although the precision decreases slightly in the case h = 2, this is likely due to smaller
sample size (the sample size decreases as the bandwidth decreases).18
The results in Table III suggest that governors have some degree of (heterogeneous) policy
motivation in regards to environmental policy. Their policy preferences differ across political
party, as revealed by their lame duck behavior.19 Nevertheless, the differences across the
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regular and lame duck periods suggest that winning governors (those staying in office until
the lame duck period) have a substantial degree of office motivation in the environmental
policy area, as electoral competition induces pooling equilibria (policy convergence) (Table
2). Below, we report the results of a robustness analysis of the findings in Tables II and III.
3.2. Initial Robustness Analysis
Several issues merit further discussion. First, a governor in her last term may not view
her current position as the end of her political career, as she could potentially run for
higher office. If this were the case, office motivated lame duck governors would have an
electoral incentive to moderate their policy choice. While such intentions are hard to measure
precisely, we take this possibility into account by excluding the 12 governors in our sample
who later ran for Congress (three of these excluded governors stayed in office long enough
to face a binding term limit). The parametric result for lame ducks remains negative and
statistically significant (results available upon request). The result should be viewed as a
lower bound estimate (in terms of magnitude) of the policy difference among lame ducks. It
is consistent with Besley and Case (1995) who provide evidence that lame duck governors
care less about their reputation than other governors, i.e. they are on average not influenced
by considerations of future re-election prospects.
Second, the analysis of re-electable governors so far includes all governors eligible for re-
election. However, governors who hold on to power long enough to become lame ducks may
be different from those governors who lose power before winning a lame duck term. If voters
care about the effort exerted in the policy implementation phase as assumed by Callander
(2008), time in office may make a difference. Voters will have had a greater opportunity
to evaluate a more seasoned governor’s performance and make inferences about the proba-
bility of the governor being policy motivated. This should raise the governor’s re-election
prospects. That is, we may expect that governors re-elected to a lame duck term have some
degree of policy motivation. On the other hand, Bernhardt et al. (2004) argue that to re-elect
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an incumbent to a last lame duck term, the median voter must believe the incumbent to be
relatively moderate, and therefore the median voter sets a stricter condition for re-election to
a lame duck period. This would suggest that re-electable governors who eventually become
lame ducks should not exhibit significantly different policies. We therefore restrict the sam-
ple to governors who remain in office sufficiently long to eventually become lame ducks. We
denote this group of re-electable governors Future-lame-duck governors. We then repeat the
analysis in Table II using only the sample of Future-lame-duck governors. In the interest of
brevity, Table IV provides only the main parametric (the forth-order polynomials) and the
non-parametric (a bandwidth h = 2) estimation results (remaining results available upon
request). The results turn out to be invariant to the specification or approach used. First,
while the point estimates are consistently positive, they remain statistically insignificant at
conventional levels (except using a first-order polynomial control function, not reported in
Table IV. Second, the estimated policy differences across parties are larger than those using
the pooled sample of all re-electable governors reported in Table II. For example, the point
estimate in Table IV, Column (1), indicates a 9.7 percent positive difference between Demo-
cratic and Republican governors. This is almost four times larger than the estimate obtained
using the pooled sample (2.6 percent). Nevertheless, the insignificant results indicate that
those governors who eventually end up winning a lame duck term are primarily office moti-
vated, but with some degree of policy preferences. This is consistent with Callander (2008),
who finds that this type of politician has an electoral advantage.
Third, while the RDD approach fares well in terms of our informal test above (i.e., the
inclusion of extra control variables), we now formally assess the validity of this approach.
As discussed above, there are two sets of tests commonly used in the literature (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010). The first test is to examine the underlying similarity of the states where
the sample observations have been collected. We cannot test this assumption for all state
characteristics, in particular not for unobservable characteristics. We are, however, able
to check whether or not the observable characteristics are similar around the cut-off point.
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Following the literature (e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010), we therefore
run a set of regressions using as independent variables the party affiliation dummy and the
control function with quartic polynomial terms. We do so separately for each observable
variable discussed in the data section. If indeed the RDD approach is valid and mimics a
randomized experiment, we would expect that the party dummy has no association with
the dependent variables in these regressions; the party affiliation dummy should not be
significantly different from zero. The results of the specification tests are reported in Panel
A, Table V. The first column presents the results for the sample of re-electable governors
and the second column reports the findings for the lame-duck sample.
Contrary to the significant differences between Democratic and Republican governors in
Table I, the specification tests in Table V reveal no significant differences in our sample
between states led by Democratic and Republican governors. For two variables, (i) Per-
centage Population over age 65, and (ii) Percentage Population aged 5-17, the coefficients
are roughly zero. The well balanced state characteristics confirm the randomness of the
governors’ party affiliations around the cut-off point; that is, the RDD is indeed as good as
a random experiment. These results indicate the plausibility of the underlying identification
assumption regarding smoothness (McCrary and Royer, 2011).
The second set of tests, the log density test proposed in McCrary (2008), examines
whether the marginal density of m is continuous at the cut-off point. The results are reported
in Panel B, Table V. The tests fail to reject the null of no discontinuity in the marginal density
of m; none of the log discontinuity estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels,
again confirming the plausibility of the RDD.
3.3. Further Robustness Analysis
So far, our analysis has assumed that candidate party affiliation effects are equivalent
across states.20 In this section, we investigate whether our results are driven by any group
of states. Specifically, we consider whether Southern states or “Green” states (with a high
density of members in environmental lobby groups) drive our results.
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First, as noted by Lee et al. (2004, p.844) the literature generally finds that in the South,
Democratic and Republican politicians “are ideologically closer than they are in the North.”.
If governors from Southern states are more homogenous in terms of policy preferences, the
degree of policy motivation and divergence among all remaining governors may be under-
estimated. Thus, we would expect that the estimated differences among both re-eleactable
and lame duck governors in the non-South may be larger than our earlier results for the
full sample, assuming governors in the non-South have some degree of policy preferences.
However, the results for re-electable governors from the non-South should remain unchanged,
if the office motive dominates among governors from the non-South. We follow the division
between Southern and non-Southern states as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Second, List and Sturm (2006) find that governors’ political behavior is influenced by the
share of the population with an intense interest in environmental policy issues. Following
List and Sturm (2006), we define Green states as the eight states with the largest member-
ship in environmental groups measured as a percentage of the state population. We define
Brown states as non-Green states. The Green states are California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont. We repeat our earlier
analysis excluding these eight states. We have no a priori information regarding differences
in policy preferences across Democratic and Republican governors in Green states versus
Brown states. Thus, we cannot predict how our results will be altered by the exclusion of
these states.
The results excluding Southern and Green states are reported in Panels A and B in
Table VI, respectively. Since non-parametric approaches are data-demanding, we report
only the main parametric results with quartic polynomial terms and additional covariates.
In the sample using re-electable governors only we find no significant differences, consistent
with our earlier results. The estimates in Table VI of 0.03 (non-Southern states) and 0.017
(Brown states), respectively, are similar to the 0.025 obtained utilizing the full sample in
Table II (Panel A.2, Column 4). However, in the non-South sample the estimated effect
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of a Democratic versus a Republican lame duck equals -13.6% (larger than when using the
pooled sample in Table III) and is again statistically significant. Thus, including the South
masks a somewhat greater difference in governor policy preferences in the rest of the nation.
However, the office motivation still appears to dominate in the Non-South. In Brown states,
Democratic lame ducks have a significantly lower growth rate of environmental spending
than their Republican counterparts. Thus, the estimates in Table VI are similar to our
baseline estimates. Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that our results are robust
and not driven by these two different groups of states.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we utilize parametric and nonparametric regression discontinuity ap-
proaches to assess the motivations of politicians who win the office of state governor. Our
focus is state environmental spending. While there are no significant differences across politi-
cal parties for governors eligible for re-election, lame duck governors set significantly different
environmental policies. We find that governors set environmental policies consistent with
them being primarily office motivated, but they also exhibit some degree of heterogeneous
policy motivation across political parties.
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Notes
1See “The Mind Behind the Muscles” by R. Lacayo, J. Ressner, and A. Leuker, Time Magazine, August
18, 2003.
2For example, Downs (1957) assumes that candidates are office motivated, while Wittman (1977, 1983)
assumes they are policy motivated.
3Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.485) argue that “The tension between opportunism and partisanship
reflects our imperfect understanding of ideology in politics.” (Persson and Tabellini (2000) refer to policy
and office motivated candidates as partisan and opportunistic, respectively).
4For studies of majority voting on environmental policy issues, see, e.g., Oates and Schwab (1988),
McAusland (2003), Siqueira (2003), Cremer et al. (2004, 2008), and Roelfsema (2007).
5While policy motivation in Callander (2008) is similar to character in Kartik and McAfee (2007), there
are some differences. In Callander (2008), candidates have preferences over the final policy outcome and
not over campaign platforms, while in Kartik and McAfee (2007) candidates with character have direct
preferences over platforms. In Callander (2008) a candidate’s advantage from having policy motivation or
character appears endogenously among voters.
6See, e.g., Dunlap et al. (2001) for evidence that a larger fraction of Democrats than Republicans sup-
ported increased spending for environmental protection during the 1973-1998 period. However, Buttel and
Flinn (1978), e.g., find that Democrats and Republicans did not differ greatly in their concerns for the
environment.
7This is a common assumption in the existing theoretical and empirical literature. For example, using a
model with imperfect information, Besley and Case (1995) argue that a politician sets policy according to her
preferences when no longer eligible to stand for re-election. They provide empirical evidence that lame duck
governors are less concerned with their reputation than other governors, as the former group do not react to
natural disasters to the same extent. List and Sturm (2006) provide a model where a lame duck governor no
longer caters to voters with environmental concerns, but set policy at her own ideal point. Alesina (1988)
suggests that in a one-shot game (such as the lame duck period) campaign promises lack credibility and the
winning politician sets policy at her bliss point, while in a repeated game the politician is able to credibly
move towards the median voter (see also Bernhardt et al. (2004)).
8Brown (2001) reports on overall state environmental spending for year 1986 to 2000. In year 2000, e.g.,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided only 24 percent of state environmental funds.
9This is the reason why the parametric RDD is also called the control function approach. The difference
between the OLS model and the parametric RDD model is whether or not f(mi) is controlled for in the
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estimation, and not the actual estimation technique. Both models are estimated via OLS. For example,
the difference between the OLS specification and the linear RDD specification is that the vote margin
variable itself, mi, is not controlled for in the OLS estimation. The RDD approach is analogous to the
Heckman selection approach in the sense that both approaches explicitly model the relationship between the
unobservable error and the treatment (here, D). However, the majority rule provides additional information
since the party affiliation of an elected governor (the treatment) is a deterministic function of the vote share
only. Equation (4) resulted from this information. This allows us to explicitly model the relationship between
unobservable errors and party affiliation using a (flexible) function of vote share only. This is done without
making any distributional assumptions, contrary to the Heckman selection approach.
10In other words, we estimate the flexible function as one function with a jump at the cut-off point of zero.
Note that while we have only one function in the model, this does not imply that the underlying functions
on both sides are necessarily the same. Instead, we can consider it as an approximation of a more complex
underlying function; a composite of the functions on both sides.
11See, e.g., (Levinson, 2001, p.131-158) (data spans 1977-1994, except 1987) and Konisky (2007) (data
spans 1985-2000) for state level measures of environmental policy stringency.
1235 states had gubernatorial term limits in year 2000. Thus, our data exploits the differences across states
in term limit legislation, as well as the changing election eligibility status of incumbent governors in states
with term limits. See Table 1 in List and Sturm (2006) for an overview of term limit legislation across states
during the 1970-2000 period, and Lopez (2003) for a survey of the effects of term limits.
13We focus only on races where a Democrat and a Republican are the top two candidates because our
interest is in estimating the difference in environmental policy between the Democratic (the treatment group)
and Republican (control group) political parties across gubernatorial elections. Vote margins are constructed
as the candidate’s percentage of the vote share (minus 50 percent) that belongs to the top two candidates.
If we were to include candidates from other political parties, our treatment variable is not well defined.
For example, if the top two candidates were a Democrat and a third-party candidate, then the Democratic
candidate’s losing the election (i.e., winning a vote share below the cut-off point) does not mean that the
Republican candidate wins the election. Our treatment, D, is then not equal to 1, nor is it 0.
14The results for bandwidths between h = 2 and h = 15 are highly similar in both Tables 2 and 3, and we
therefore omit these estimates (results available upon request).
15Recall that there is also a trade-off in the non-parametric approach. As we restrict the sample to a
smaller neighborhood, we find more consistent but potentially less precise results due to the decreasing
sample size. That is, the insignificant results may be attributed to the sample size. However, we note that
the standard errors do not increase dramatically as the sample size decreases. Moreover, in comparing the
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results using the electable governors and lame-duck governor samples below, we can also see that the sample
size is less likely to be the reason for the insignificant results observed here.
16We note that in a study of strategic interactions among states, Konisky (2007) reports several models
indicating that in states with Democratic governors, the number of plant environmental inspections were
significantly lower. Konisky (2007) does not adjust for vote margin, however.
17We recognize that time lags involved with budget decisions may affect these estimates. We believe such
lags are likely to lead to under-estimates of the policy divergence across lame ducks.
18Recall that a bandwidth h = 2 implies that we include only the states where the Democratic candidate
barely lost (with vote share greater than 48 percent), and the states where the Democratic candidate barely
won (with vote share less than 52 percent). A bandwidth of h = 2 results in a sample size of 48.
19We believe there are a number of possible reasons why our findings differ from those of Besley and
Case (1995), who find that Democratic lame ducks set significantly higher per capita total state taxes and
expenditures. These include: (i) By utilizing a regression-discontinuity design, we account for the endogeneity
problem to a greater extent than does Besley and Case’s study; (ii) The dependent variables are different;
Besley and Case study more aggregate measures; (iii) We use the growth rate of expenditures rather than
levels; and (iv) The time periods differ. We also note that Millimet et al. (2004) (who extend Besley and
Case’s data set to 1999) find that Republican lame ducks raise overall state taxes and spending per capita
more than do Democratic lame ducks.
20Strictly speaking, even the estimated effects in RDD estimation using the full sample are not necessarily
average treatment effects. As the identification mainly comes from the cut-off point, without stronger
assumptions the estimated effects can be interpreted as local average treatment effects for a certain sub-
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(d) Lame Duck Governors: h∗ = 4.1
Figure 1: Estimates of Democratic Governors on Environmental Policy
Note: The thick lines are fitted values from fourth order polynomial regressions, and the
thin lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. h is the bandwidth; h∗ is the bandwidth
chosen by the cross-validation method (Ludwig and Miller (2007)). Negative (positive) vote
margins imply that Republican (Democratic) governors are elected. The data points in the
graphs are the averages of the growth rate of state environmental spending within each bin;
see text for details.
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Republican Democrat
Growth Rate of Environmental Expenditure 0.036 0.033 0.038
Per Capita (in 1982-1984 dollars) (0.168) (0.167) (0.169)
State Personal Income Per Capita 13008.79 13392.12 12718.62
(2425.674) (2431.479) (2382.087)
State Population 4.966 5.44 4.608
(5.215) (5.888) (4.613)
Percentage Population over 0.118 0.121 0.116
age 65 (0.02) (0.019) (0.021)
Percentage Population aged 0.206 0.203 0.209
between 5 and 17 (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Membership in Environmental 0.843 0.861 0.83
Organizations (0.357) (0.35) (0.361)
No. of Observations 1388 598 790
1 Standard deviations in parentheses. See the text for detailed variable definitions.
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Table II: Estimates of Democratic Governor on Environmental Policy: Re-Electable Governors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Parametric Results
OLS Result Parametric Regression Discontinuity Results
Linear Quadratic Triple Quartic
Panel A.1: Without Additional Controls
Democrat 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.014 0.026
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
No. of Obs 1028 992 992 992 992
Panel A.2: With Additional Controls
Democrat 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.025
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
No. of Obs 1028 992 992 992 992
Panel B. Nonparametric Results
h = 2 h = 15 h = 20 h = 25
Democrat 0.011 0.02 0.011 0.008
(0.044) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
No. of Obs 204 850 944 971
1 Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) in brackets. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Dependent variable in all estimations: Growth rate in state environmental
spending per capita. State and time fixed effects are included in all parametric estimation
specifications (Panel A). The results in Panel A.2 are obtained from the parametric specifications
with additional covariates included. These covariates are state personal income per capita; state
population; percentage population over age 65; percentage population aged between 5 and 17;
membership in environmental organizations.
2 Column (1) reports the OLS results. Columns (2)-(5) in Panel A report the parametric RDD
results using control function approach with different order of polynomial terms. Columns (2)-
(5) in Panel B report the nonparametric RDD results using the local linear regression approach.
Columns correspond to different choices of bandwidths, h. The difference in the number of
observations between Column (1) and Column (2) is due to missing information on the vote
margin for some re-electable governors; e.g., some governors did not gain office through an
election but due to other reasons.
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Table III: Estimates of Democratic Governor on Environmental Policy: Lame Duck Governors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Parametric Results
OLS Result Parametric Regression Discontinuity Results
Linear Quadratic Triple Quartic
Panel A.1: Without Additional Controls
Democrat -0.016 -0.051*** -0.046** -0.05** -0.082***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)
No. of Obs 360 360 360 360 360
Panel A.2: With Additional Controls
Democrat -0.018 -0.046** -0.041** -0.045** -0.078***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024)
No. of Obs 360 360 360 360 360
Panel B. Nonparametric Results
h = 2 h = 15 h = 20 h = 25
Democrat -0.092* -0.055** -0.064*** -0.052**
(0.046) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021)
No. of Obs 48 282 301 337
1 Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) in brackets. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Dependent variable in all estimations: Growth rate in state environ-
mental spending per capita. State and time fixed effects are included in all parametric
estimation specifications (Panel A).
2 The results in Panel A.2 are obtained from the parametric specifications with additional
covariates included. These covariates are state personal income per capita; state popula-
tion; percentage population over age 65; percentage population aged between 5 and 17;
membership in environmental organizations.
3 Column (1) reports the OLS results. Columns (2)-(5) in Panel A report the parametric
RDD results using the control function approach with different orders of polynomial
terms. Columns (2)-(5) in Panel B report the nonparametric RDD results using the local
linear regression approach. Columns correspond to different choices of bandwidths h.
35
Table IV: Estimates of Democratic Governor on Environmental Policy: Re-Electable Gov-
ernors (Future-Lame-Duck Sample)
Parametric Non-Parametric
Quartic Quartic h = 2
(1) (2) (3)
Democrat 0.097 0.095 0.112
(0.086) (0.086) (0.103)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes
No. of Observations 278 278 58
1 Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
2 Columns (1) and (2) report the RDD results using the control function of quartic polyno-
mials without and with covariates, respectively. Column (3) reports the RDD results using
nonparametirc results with the bandwidth h = 2. The estimation utilizes only the sample of
Future-Lame-Duck governors in the non-lame duck periods.
3 Dependent variable in all estimations: Growth rate in state environmental spending per capita.
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Table V: Specification Tests of Random Assignment Assumption of RDD
Estimates
Re-Electable Lame Duck
Panel A: Balancing Tests on Observed Covariates
State Personal Income Per Capita -431.236 685.283
(514.002) (1031.67)
State Population -1.498 -1.172
(1.365) (1.508)
Percentage Population over age 65 -0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.009)
Percentage Population aged between 5 and 17 0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.012)
Membership in Environmental Organizations 0.034 0.04
(0.072) (0.098)
Panel B: McCrary (2008) Log Density Tests
Log Discontinuity Estimates -0.174 -0.122
(0.112) (0.190)
1 Standard errors in parentheses. All discontinuities are estimated with a regression of the
variable on 4th order polynomial terms of margin variable and an indicator of democratic
governor. The coefficients and standard errors in the table are those of the indicator
variable.
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Table VI: Heterogeneity Results: The Effect of Democratic Governor on Environmental Policy
Re-electable Lame Duck Re-electable Lame Duck
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Southern States Brown States
Democrat 0.03 -0.136** 0.017 -0.076***
(0.02) (0.056) (0.019) (0.026)
No. of Observations 740 163 832 330
1 Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) in brackets. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
2 Dependent variable in all estimations: Growth rate in state environmental spend-
ing per capita.
3 All the estimation is based on forth-order polynomials. In addition to state and
time fixed effects, the following covariates are included in the estimation: state
personal income per capita; state population; percentage population over age
65; percentage population aged between 5 and 17; membership in environmental
organizations.
4 Southern states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.
5 The Green states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont. Brown states are the non-green states.
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